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FRESH THINKING FOR AN OLD PROBLEM
Report of the Naval War College Workshop on
Countering Maritime Piracy
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy
The problem of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia has escalated over thepast year, beginning with the seizure of the very large crude carrier Sirius
Star in November 2008. The supertanker was carrying two million barrels of oil,
and a ransom of three million dollars was paid for the release of the $100 million
cargo and the twenty-five crew members being held hostage. The Sirius Star mo-
tivated a number of important international initiatives to counter piracy.
More progress occurred in counterpiracy diplomacy during the ninety days
between the end of October 2008 and end of January 2009 than had transpired
in the previous ninety years. During this time the
United Nations finished a comprehensive report on
the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolutions 1846 (on 2 De-
cember) and 1851 (on 16 December). Resolution 1851
encouraged creation of a multinational Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; the “Con-
tact Group,” as it is known, consists of more than
twenty nations and met for the first time in January
2009. Since then, the Contact Group and subordinate
working groups have met on a number of occasions,
with the fourth meeting, in September, to be chaired
by Japan. The United Kingdom signed a bilateral
agreement to hand over pirates to Kenya in December,
and the United States signed a similar agreement in
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January. (The European Union and Kenya signed a similar accord on 6 May. The
Arab and African states in the region reached agreement on the nonbinding Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct to facilitate greater regional cooperation against piracy.
Both the Contact Group and the Djibouti Code nations acknowledged the need
to create a regional counterpiracy center modeled on the sixteen-nation re-
gional counterpiracy Information Sharing Centre in Singapore.
In early 2009 the expectation was that these efforts would soon begin to pay off,
reducing the number of attacks from 2008. Nearly nine hundred seafarers had
been taken hostage in 2008, and pirates had seized more than forty vessels. But by
May 2009 the number of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia already had
eclipsed the figure in 2008. The blueprints for a more effective international-law
framework have largely been drafted; reducing piracy now requires that the next
steps be taken.
With this in mind, the International Law Department of the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, conducted
a counterpiracy workshop on 7 and 8 April 2009.1 Comprising fifty legal and
policy experts from across the globe, the workshop captured a number of find-
ings and vetted recommendations for continuing the effort against maritime pi-
racy. The participants “took away” four major findings. First, it was apparent to
them that piracy in the Horn of Africa has emerged from a complex political,
economic, and cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem. Sec-
ond, regional capacity building and collective maritime action will be required
to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctu-
ary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by “fixing” Somalia, however, beg the
question of how to go about the task, as it is doubtful that the international com-
munity has the capability or will to transform Somalia quickly into a stable and
viable state.
Third, the participants were convinced that only the major maritime powers
have the skill and resources to help the regional states expand coastal and littoral
maritime-security capability rapidly. Security assistance to the regional states,
including training and provision of patrol craft, can shift responsibility for
counterpiracy to the states of the neighborhood. Eventually, these states should
acquire and operate offshore patrol vessels, even corvettes. Shifting responsibil-
ity for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers, the workshop felt,
benefits everyone. Finally, the civil shipping industry should take a greater role
in protecting merchant vessels, including integrating passive design measures
that make it more difficult for pirates to board a ship. In some cases, this means
that provision of private armed security may be appropriate.
The workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime pi-
racy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law
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and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and consider the way
forward. By collecting many of the world’s top experts to consider the threat of
maritime piracy and by providing a forum in which they could discuss the issue
in a frank and open way, the workshop challenged some conventional thinking
and explored new approaches. The participants brought significant diversity
and depth of expertise. Many are involved in day-to-day decision making on
counterpiracy operations, policy, and international law in Europe, Asia, and the
United States.2 The workshop comprised participants from South and East Asia,
Europe, and the United States. The participants represented a variety of eclectic
professional backgrounds; they included international-law attorneys; advisers
in the areas of oceans policy, irregular maritime warfare, and maritime piracy,
from several continents; representatives of the international civil shipping in-
dustry; and maritime piracy and naval experts from academic and policy re-
search institutions. The work was facilitated by a state-of-the-art briefing
center—the Naval War College’s Decision Support Center—that can anony-
mously tabulate participants’ responses to issues under consideration, creating a
nonattribution record of the proceedings.
THE THREAT
The workshop opened with a presentation by a prominent irregular mari-
time warfare expert, who provided a threat assessment for the group. The
threat assessment concluded that although Somalia is a failed state, it is not a
failed society. Central government has collapsed, but other forms of author-
ity remain. Some forms of authority are local, restricted to individual towns
and villages. Others derive from clan or subclan status and from elders able to
exercise their authority using traditional means. Power also flows from polit-
ical figures, who exercise authority through negotiation or the patronage of
largely self-interested supporters or allies. Finally, militias and Islamic courts
exercise considerable influence in Somali society. Clan organization, then, is
a context rather than a determinant of piracy.
On 21 November 2008 the UN released a report by the special representative
of the secretary-general on piracy off the coast of Somalia, based on meetings
held in Nairobi, Kenya.3 The Nairobi report suggests that piracy off the coast of
Somalia is driven by the volatile security and political situations inside the coun-
try, rampant poverty, and other factors. Using the Nairobi report as a point of
departure, the workshop considered the leading contributors to maritime piracy
in East Africa. The workshop participants considered the causal factors con-
tained in the Nairobi report as potential drivers of Somali piracy, independently
scoring them by perceived importance.
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Among the factors considered as potentially contributing to Somali piracy
were poverty; lack of employment; environmental hardship; a reduction in
pastoralist and fishing resources; illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU)
fishing; and the volatile political and security situations. The experts were asked
to score these factors in order of importance. On average the participants scored
factors highest in relation to the volatile security and political situations in So-
malia and lowest in regard to environmental hardship. Several workshop experts
suggested additional factors that they considered important in fostering condi-
tions in which piracy can flourish. First, a sanctuary ashore provides a haven
from which pirates can operate with apparent impunity. Second, the opportu-
nity to conduct piracy is enhanced by the geographic location of the nation of
Somalia and close proximity of the major piracy hubs of Haradhere and Eyl to
the international shipping route through the Suez Canal. Third, the presence in
Somalia of legions of destitute young men and of numerous unpaid, or under-
paid, complicit and corrupt officials populates the piracy enterprise. Finally, the
low level of risk of getting either caught or killed while committing piracy, and
the prospect of high rewards, continues to draw Somalis into the illicit business.
The risk/reward calculus is favorable to piracy, attracting more than two hun-
dred teams, and the number is increasing.4 It has to be changed.
A number of nations have readily paid ransoms in order to obtain the release
of their nationals and ships held by Somali pirates. Some states, including Den-
mark, have themselves released captured pirates unpunished due to legal and
diplomatic confusion or difficulty in detaining and prosecuting the perpetrators
in criminal court. The Nairobi study suggests that these practices have encour-
aged piracy. Although the wider international community has universally con-
demned piracy off the coast of Somalia, the Nairobi report indicates, the same
nations have been tolerant of piracy by either sanctioning the crime or facilitat-
ing payment of ransoms. Some nations have deployed warships to the area ap-
parently without giving them authority to take robust action to arrest or detain
pirates or to use force to disrupt attacks. The workshop experts were asked to
characterize whether they agreed with the Nairobi report’s description of the re-
sponse by the international community. Most of the experts—thirty of
thirty-four—either agreed or strongly agreed with the report’s characterization
that the international community has either sanctioned or tolerated maritime
piracy off the coast of Somalia. Only four experts either disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the report in this regard.
The workshop received a detailed brief on the political, social, and economic
motivations of Somali pirates. Pirates are exploiting the vacuum created by an-
archy in Somalia. The lack of rule of law inside the nation spills offshore. Somali
pirates are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain. Moreover, the crime of
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maritime piracy has some amount of acceptance in a society whose values have
been distorted by conflict and violence. Piracy in the offshore areas of Somalia is
perpetrated by organized criminal gangs that benefit from political protection,
so solutions will have to account for the wider political context inside the coun-
try. The rational risk/reward calculus of the pirate gangs has to be changed by
making piracy less rewarding and at the same time more risky. So far there has
been a high tolerance for piracy because costs are diffuse throughout the inter-
national system, with no single nation bearing the burden. Consequently, orga-
nizing a response to thwart piracy represents a classic collective-action problem.
The need to shift the outcome of this equation is obvious, but the means to do so
are debatable. This conclusion gives rise to the division of responsibility among
regional states, distant states, and the private sector.
The experts carefully considered a series of questions posed to them over the
course of the two-day workshop. Many of the queries were designed to capture
the sense of the group by placing a proposition on the table and then asking the
experts to respond. Generally, participants categorized their replies into quin-
tiles—strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree.
The experts provided individual assessments of the likely impact of Somali
piracy on international trade from Europe to Asia through the Suez Canal and
the Gulf of Aden over the next five years. Twenty of thirty-four experts agreed
that the impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on Europe-to-Asia mari-
time trade through the Suez Canal, the strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of
Aden over the next five years. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly disagreed,
and one expert was neutral on this question. In sum, there was a lack of consen-
sus on the severity of the impact of Somali piracy along the critical trade route
connecting Europe and Asia.
The workshop also considered the anticipated impact of Somali piracy on
global shipping over the next five years. The participants’ views were even
more circumspect than on the previous question. A greater number of ex-
perts—sixteen—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition
that the likely impact of Somali piracy on global shipping will be “severe.”
Seven participants registered a “neutral” response, and no expert was in strong
agreement with the statement that the impact of piracy will be severe.
Similarly, the workshop experts were not in agreement on the number of pi-
racy attacks expected to occur in the region in 2012. In 2008, more than a hun-
dred vessels were attacked, and more than forty were hijacked off the Horn of
Africa. When asked, “By 2012, how many vessels do you expect to be success-
fully hijacked in the region?” the experts gave estimates ranging from a low of
two or three per year to a high of 450, with most responses in the 50-to-250
range.
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There was, however, quite strong agreement that if Somali piracy is to be suc-
cessfully addressed, the rule of law has to be restored in the Puntland region of
Somalia. Puntland serves as the primary staging area for most piracy emanating
from the country. Thirty-three out of thirty-four experts agreed or strongly
agreed that restoration of the rule of law in Somalia was essential for curbing pi-
racy. Only one expert disagreed with the statement that “in order to curb piracy
in the offshore region, it is necessary for law and order to be restored in Puntland
and the coastal areas of Somalia.”
The next question considered by the experts posed a broader challenge: If it is
necessary to restore law and order in Somalia, how can that goal be achieved?
There is an absence of international consensus on how to engineer the stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction of Somalia; some analysts are so discouraged that they
doubt the country can be stabilized any time soon. The elusive quest for a “So-
malia policy” has persisted since the collapse of the country in 1991; neither the
United States nor other nations have found a coherent approach to revitalizing
the country. The issue of piracy, however, has now attracted public attention to
the plight of Somalia. On 23 April 2009, thirty nations participating in a UN
meeting in Brussels developed a $250 million plan to restore stability in the frac-
tured state. Strengthening regional maritime security in order to reduce piracy
was among the top concerns at the conference. The international community,
the conference attendees felt, has a chance to turn adversity into opportunity
and perhaps bring some measure of law and order to the country. It remains to
be seen whether the donors’ conference that was conducted in Brussels will
make a positive and marked difference.
REGIONAL RESPONSES
During the past five years, a large group of Asian states have cooperated to
counter piracy in the straits of Malacca and Singapore and throughout South-
east Asia. Many observers credit these efforts with reducing the incidence of
piracy throughout the Asia-Pacific, and such cooperation has knit the nations
together in a regional counterpiracy community. Asian counterpiracy cooper-
ation has emerged from three mutually supporting initiatives.
First, under the leadership of Japan in 2004, sixteen nations signed the Re-
gional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP).5
ReCAAP, the first treaty dedicated solely to combating piracy, established an or-
ganization that operates an advanced information fusion and sharing center in
Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre helps individual nations take action
to avoid piracy attacks and respond more effectively when they occur. Second,
beginning in 2005, more than twenty-five states that regularly use the straits of
Malacca and Singapore—including the large trading nations of China, Japan,
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the United States, and Korea—began meeting with the littoral states of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore to develop a combined framework for improving
maritime safety in the straits.6 The meetings were sponsored by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN specialized agency for maritime
matters and shipping regulation, located in London. After several years, the user
nations and littoral states signed the Cooperative Mechanism, an agreement that
enables user states to help littoral nations develop maritime-security capacity
for better management of the straits.7 Third, the three littoral states along the
straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface and air patrols
in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand has joined the effort.
The workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian initiatives
could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of do-
ing so were potentially significant, the responses indicated that the experts
were quite divided on the feasibility of transplanting the “Asian model” of
counterpiracy cooperation and international institutions to the Horn of Af-
rica. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly disagreed that the Asian initiatives
were a suitable model for East Africa. On the other hand, twelve experts either
agreed or strongly agreed that such institutions could be transplanted from
Southeast Asia to the Horn of Africa. Seven experts were neutral on this issue.
Relatedly, the experts were nearly unanimous in rejecting the notion that no
key differences exist between piracy off the coast of Somalia and in Southeast
Asia. Seventeen experts strongly disagreed, and thirteen disagreed, with the
proposition that no key differences existed between piracy in Africa and piracy
in Asia. Only one expert agreed (and one expert strongly agreed) with the
statement. Somalia is a failed state, embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal con-
flict, and endemic corruption and woefully lacking effective governance, pre-
dictability, and rule of law. Its social fabric and governance are in disrepair. Its
neighboring nations of East Africa are more functional, but even they face
startling defects in governance, security, and bureaucratic capacity. The region
is not economically dynamic, like East Asia. Consequently, the area suffers
from a low tax base, low penetration of technology, and difficulty in integrat-
ing populations of various backgrounds.
Similarly, nearly all of the discussants disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
idea that no modifications would be required if the Asian model of fighting piracy
could be transplanted to Africa. Clearly, if East Asian approaches and institutions
are to be adopted in East Africa, they will have to be tailored to local conditions.
Only one expert suggested that no modification would be needed for transplant-
ing the Asian model to the Horn of Africa. Eighteen experts strongly disagreed
and thirteen experts disagreed with the statement that no modifications to the
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Asian model of counterpiracy cooperation would be necessary in order to trans-
plant it to the coast of Somalia.
DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES
Given that it is unlikely that quick progress can be made in changing the funda-
mental conditions that abet piracy, the immediate focus must be on containing
it and taking cost-effective measures to reduce or manage the risk. The interna-
tional community already has achieved significant diplomatic success in coun-
tering piracy.
Recent efforts include, as previously mentioned, release of a UN study (the
Nairobi report); formation of the UN Contact Group; negotiation of the Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct; bilateral agreements between the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union, respectively, with Kenya; and Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851, under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter (authorizing states to take “all necessary measures”). With a view
toward building on this progress, the experts were asked to consider how much
responsibility various global actors had for addressing the problem of piracy off
the coast of Somalia. Among the categories of actors were regional states, the
shipping industry, flag states, and nations with the most registered vessels at risk
of piracy attack. Interestingly, the workshop experts assigned fairly similar levels
of responsibility to regional states, the shipping industry, and flag states.
The workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various in-
ternational institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa.
The experts each assigned values to the relative importance of particular inter-
national institutions in addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia. The UN Security Council topped the list of the most important global
institutions for countering maritime piracy, followed by the IMO and the Euro-
pean Union.
Furthermore, the workshop considered the question of whether the diplo-
matic efforts now under way were well integrated with the naval efforts to sup-
press piracy. The responses to this question indicated a lack of widespread
agreement among the experts on the point. Twelve experts agreed or strongly
agreed that the efforts were well integrated, eleven experts were neutral on this
point, and ten experts either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposi-
tion. In addition to responding to these questions, the experts provided rec-
ommendations on other diplomatic initiatives that might offer promise. It was
noted that the Djibouti Code of Conduct was a nonbinding instrument and
some experts suggested that the Arab and African states that negotiated it
should make it a binding treaty. Furthermore, participants felt states from out-
side the area should be encouraged to provide assistance in the form of
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training, communications, small boats, and infrastructure to improve the
maritime-security capacity of the nations of the Horn of Africa. Just as Japan
provided leadership in construction of a regional counterpiracy center in Sin-
gapore, one or more nations should assist the regional states in the construc-
tion and operation of a regional maritime-security coordination center. In this
regard, Egypt and Saudi Arabia possess the means and the interest necessary to
develop greater maritime security in the region.
The UN Security Council, the experts suggested, should consider authorizing
naval forces operating in the area to seize the accoutrements of piracy, such as
high-horsepower outboard motors mounted on the sterns of Somali skiffs. The
Security Council could declare a specifically tailored maritime exclusion zone
adjacent to the Somalia coastline, forbidding the use of large outboard motors
within it. Fishermen and other civil boatmen have little need for high-powered
outboard motors, which enable the small and fast pirate skiffs to overtake large
merchant vessels. By banning the use of such powerful engines, the international
community can reduce the availability of the means of pirate attack. Such en-
gines should be subject to seizure and destruction on sight by the international
naval forces operating in the area.
Further, the Contact Group should adopt a means of decoupling the Somali
piracy gangs from the tribal and social structure of the country through targeted
aid and increased support to alternative centers of authority inside the country.
The donors’ conference is a first step toward realizing this approach. Further-
more, the international community, possibly working through INTERPOL,
should implement a counterpiracy “rewards for justice” program to identify and
apprehend the leading offenders.
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa, off of which are over two million
square miles of water at risk of piracy, a factor that complicates naval strategy.
The experts were divided as to whether the world’s naval forces are effective in
addressing piracy off the Horn of Africa. Not one expert strongly agreed that na-
val forces are effective and sixteen experts either disagreed or strongly disagreed.
Four experts were neutral on the proposition, and ten experts agreed, that naval
forces were effectively responding to piracy.
Moreover, the deployment of large numbers of warships from distant states
into the area is probably not sustainable. Many of the nations that have sent war-
ships are unaccustomed to operating them far from home waters and without
logistical support in unfamiliar regions. Furthermore, it is not clear that such a
large area can realistically be patrolled at all, even by a large multinational force.
It would take more than sixty warships to provide an effective presence over the
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length of a single, narrow transit corridor. Until other, more effective ap-
proaches are developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no imme-
diate substitute for operational patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, a
majority of workshop experts—eighteen out of twenty-two—either agreed or
strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be doing even more than at
present to counter piracy.
The workshop experts offered additional operational options that might be
implemented:
• Deception: warships disguised as civil merchant shipping (like the World
War II Q-ships).
• Land strike: armed assault upon safe havens and logistics activities on the
shore. (However, it was argued that land strikes against identified pirate
staging areas would be difficult to conduct and likely ignite anti-Western
reaction and inflame Muslim sensitivities, making the cure worse than the
disease.)
• Blockade: monitoring the entrance and egress of shipping into and out of
Somalia in order to cut pirates off from their bases on land.
• Embargo: preventing the introduction, by land, sea, or air, of weapons,
communications devices, and other equipment destined for use by pirate
gangs.
• Tailored exclusion zone: prohibition (as noted above) of the use of certain
items or devices, such as high-horsepower outboard motors, in designated
areas, such as Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.
• Unmanned systems: greater use of unmanned systems for detection and
monitoring of piracy activity. (It was felt that such technology might re-
duce warship requirements and serve as a force multiplier for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.)
It was argued that smaller warships, such as offshore patrol vessels and cor-
vettes, should be employed for combating piracy over the long term. Fast patrol
boats are more efficient platforms than large warships for the task, and regional
capabilities can be more easily aligned with small boat security operations. Until
such time as regional maritime-security capacity can complement or eventually
replace the foreign presence, nations could operate offshore patrol vessels from
within the region. If safe port facilities are unavailable, such boats could be sea
based, with logistics vessels. The limitations of smaller vessels, which include
lower endurance and lack of organic aviation, can be offset by operating them in
greater numbers from multiple ports and using land-based maritime patrol
aircraft.
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Further, the experts felt, there is in the near term a need to identify a single
contact point—such as United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, in
Dubai—for vessels facing immediate threats. Over the long term, creation of a
regional maritime-security coordination center to fuse intelligence and share
information is essential to shifting responsibility toward regional states. This
need presents an opportunity for regional states dependent on the safety of
freedom of navigation in the Horn of Africa—specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and the Gulf states—to provide funding and training to that end. In one step in
the right direction, at a maritime-security conference in Riyadh during the last
week of June, delegates from eleven states of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea
reached an agreement on creation of an Arab naval task force to address the
threat of piracy to oil and gas tankers that transit the Red Sea and Suez Canal to
and from the Mediterranean. Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen are expected
to provide forces for the task force.
Finally, the workshop found, the development of an organic area coastal
force, a Somali coast guard, is a necessary, if long-term, goal. The U.S. Africa
Command and Central Command should consider creative approaches for in-
ternational coalition commitments to training and equipping such a force. One
opportunity for security assistance and capacity building is the nascent Somali
coast guard. After two decades without a maritime force, the nation is develop-
ing a coast guard by training five hundred Somali sailors on the grounds of the
old port in Mogadishu.8
ADDITIONAL FOCUS AREAS
Programs within Somalia
Regional and maritime action is required to contend with the challenge so long as
pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. The last time the international com-
munity took military action to change the situation in Somalia, it did not go well.
As for the future of governance in that nation, it was unclear to the participants
whether a stronger central government, on one hand, or stronger clan system, on
the other, would yield greater stability and governance. The dichotomy replicates
all of the promise—and difficulty—experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. None-
theless, providing greater development assistance to Somali clan elders who may
have some influence in reducing piracy was suggested. Relatedly, the potential for
disrupting the piracy financing and ransom system through coordinated banking
security was argued. (A month after the workshop, INTERPOL announced a plan
to track piracy financing.)
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Industry and Shipping Security
The international civil shipping industry, participants argued, will have to take
additional steps to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the areas of greatest
risk. Merchant ships should continue to broaden their defensive responses, to
include such passive measures as barbed wire strung on the lifelines and, poten-
tially, assignment of security personnel (either organic or under contract) on
board certain ships, such as slow vessels (dredgers and barges) or those carrying
sensitive cargoes. At the third meeting of the Contact Group, in New York City
on 29 May, Bahamas, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama, signed the New
York Declaration, committing to bringing their large merchant fleets into com-
pliance with the self-protection measures contained in the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code. Combined, these four states account for half the
world’s international shipping gross tonnage. A majority of experts—a total of
twenty—either agreed or strongly agreed that the counterpiracy approaches
taken by the merchant shipping industry were well aligned to the threat.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
In considering the American interagency process, the experts had mixed views
on whether the disparate departments and agencies were working together ef-
fectively to address Somali piracy, with most experts characterizing the level of
success as neutral or as successful but not “strongly” so. Finally, the majority of
experts believed that the interagency community was working well to combat
piracy. The experts, which included the lead representatives for antipiracy oper-
ations and diplomacy from within the agencies and departments of the U.S. gov-
ernment responsible for American policy, considered this statement: “Within
the U.S. government, the interagency community is working together success-
fully to counter piracy.” Ten agreed with the statement. Six experts disagreed or
strongly disagreed with it, but eight experts were neutral on the issue, so there
was little consensus on the point.
In a follow-up question, sixteen of the experts held the view that the U.S. ex-
ecutive branch interagency community was working well together whatever the
success such work produced. Five experts were neutral on this point, and three
disagreed.
However, the experts rejected the idea that no impediments have to be over-
come to facilitate interagency cooperation. When asked to evaluate the state-
ment “There are no impediments to U.S. government efforts to achieve
interagency cooperation,” nineteen experts either disagreed or strongly dis-
agreed. Four experts were neutral on this proposition, one agreed, and one
strongly agreed. The sense, then, is that effective interagency coordination
against maritime piracy within the government faces an uphill struggle. This is
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somewhat surprising, and discouraging, because American maritime-security
policy is coordinated through the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Com-
mittee (MSIPC), under policy set forth in National Security Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 41 of December 2004. The departments of Defense, State,
Homeland Security, and Transportation, as well as the intelligence community
and other agencies, participate in regular meetings of that committee. The com-
mittee led development of the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, an-
nex B to that document, the 2007 Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy, and the
December 2008 Action Plan to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.
The depth of the discussion and the variety and originality of the discourse, con-
ducted in a nonattribution environment, were productive. The seizure of the
Maersk Alabama, in particular, has elicited from numerous commentators such
prescriptions as “it’s time to get tough,” or “we have to change the risk/reward
calculus” of the pirates. Ultimately, everyone agrees that the best solution is for a
restoration of law and order within the country of Somalia, but neither the in-
ternational community nor the United States has been able to produce such an
outcome. Hard realities lie behind those platitudes, and they require that spe-
cific courses of action be patiently thought through, on the basis of an accurate
picture of the causes and motivators of Somali piracy. Furthermore, the work-
shop demonstrated, there is no single solution to the problem of Somali piracy.
At least the rampant piracy off the coast of Somalia from the seizure of the
Sirius Star to the attack on the Maersk Alabama in April 2009 has focused world
attention on an often ignored corner of the globe. In May 2009 the Netherlands
and Russia suggested creation of an international piracy court. But perhaps a
more promising alternative would be to build the rule of law and capacity for
governance and maintenance of security in the states throughout the region.
Roughly five hundred men have recently joined the emergent Somali coast
guard, but without fast patrol boats, radar, or communications equipment, the
force is overmatched by the pirates.9 All, Somalia in particular, would benefit
from increased security assistance. Just as important, capacity building would
generate long-lasting benefits in economic and security partnerships and facili-
tate closer security integration with neighboring states, friends, and allies.
Operationally, the threat of piracy has presented the first test of the concept of
a spontaneous “global maritime partnership” and of the U.S. sea services’ Coop-
erative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.10 By any measure, the concepts are be-
ing validated, and the test is being passed. The follow-through, the movement
from coordination among the larger out-of-area naval forces toward regional ef-
forts and local capacity building, will require commitment, generous resources,
and political resolution in East Africa and throughout the globe.
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NOTE S
An earlier version of this text has been circu-
lated in pamphlet form as Commander James
Kraska, JAGC, USN, The Report on the U.S.
Naval War College Workshop on Somali Pi-
racy: Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat (New-
port, R.I.: Naval War College, 28 April 2009).
1. The workshop was sponsored with generous
support from the Naval War College Founda-
tion, SAIC Corporation, and Booz Allen
Hamilton. Professor Dennis Mandsager,
chairman of the International Law Depart-
ment, provided strategic guidance for the
project, and Commander Sandra Selman,
USCG, was a principal organizer of the event.
2. This point was underscored on the second
day of the workshop, when a number of at-
tendees joined a U.S. government interagency
phone conference to plan a course of action
for dealing with the overnight hijacking and
ensuing hostage standoff involving the M/V
Maersk Alabama.
3. Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,
comp., Piracy Off the Somali Coast: Final Re-
port: Assessment and Recommendations (re-
port of Workshop Commissioned by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-
General of the UN to Somalia, Nairobi,
Kenya, 10–21 November 2008).
4. Richard Meade, “Pirate Threatens Increased
Violence,” Lloyd’s List, 8 July 2009, pp. 1–2.
5. The sixteen countries were the People’s Re-
public of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the
Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic
of China, the Republic of India, the Republic
of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Repub-
lic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singa-
pore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the So-
cialist Republic of Viet Nam.
6. Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO
Doc. KUL 1/4, 20 September 2006 (report of
Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety,
Security, and Environmental Protection,
18–20 September 2006), available at
www.imo.org/.
7. The Singapore meeting also recognized the
contributions of the straits states in the devel-
opment of Malacca Strait security initiatives.
8. Alisha Ryu, “Analysts Skeptical New Somali
Navy Can Fight Piracy,” Voice of America
News, 18 June 2009, available at www
.voanews.com/english/.
9. Jamal Osman and Lauren Gelfand, “Somalia
Trains Navy Recruits in Anti-piracy Strug-
gle,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 June 2009, p.
25.
10. See James Kraska and Brian Wilson, “The
Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the
Gulf of Aden,” RUSI Journal 74, no. 81 (April
2009), and James Kraska and Brian Wilson,
“The Global Maritime Partnership and So-
mali Piracy,” Defense & Security Analysis 25,
no. 3 (September 2009). The strategy was re-
printed in the Naval War College Review
Winter 2008 issue, available at www.usnwc
.edu/press/.
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